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Implementing Basel III Through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV: 
Leverage Ratios and Capital Adequacy Requirements 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV, which constitutes the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR),             
as well as the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), is aimed at implementing Basel III in the European                 
Union. Consequently, this CRD package, replaces Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 with a Regulation and a               
Directive. The significance of such a move not only highlights the awareness of the importance of ensuring that                  
Basel rules and regulations become more binding and enforceable, but also signals an era whereby the use of                  
enforcement and supervisory tools such as Binding Technical Standards (BTS) are being introduced and              
generated by the European Banking Authority, as its plays a crucial role in the implementation of Basel III in                   
the EU. 
 
Another significance of such a move towards Basel rules and regulations becoming more enforceable and               
binding lies in the facilitation of greater consistency, convergence and compliance, which the introduction of a                
Regulation, Binding Technical Standards, as well as other reporting requirements and provisions would             
generate in the implementation process. The increased relevance of Basel rules, and particularly Basel III rules,                
as well as their significance for the Eurozone, European Union institutions and European banks is hereby                
emphasised. 
 
This paper is also aimed at providing an analysis of the recent updates which have taken place in respect of the                     
Basel III Leverage Ratio and the Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio – both in respect of recent                 
amendments introduced by the Basel Committee and proposals introduced in the United States.  
 
As well as highlighting and addressing gaps which exist in the literature relating to liquidity risks, corporate                 
governance and information asymmetries, by way of reference to pre-dominant based dispersed ownership             
systems and structures, as well as concentrated ownership systems and structures, this paper will also consider  
the consequences – as well as the impact - which Basel III, and in particular, the recent Basel Leverage ratios                    
could have on the Eurozone, and European financial institutions.  
 
From this perspective, the rise of macro economics, micro economic inefficiency debates - as well as the                 
validity of such debates will be considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
Basel III, Capital Requirements Directive IV, European Banking Authority, enforcement, supervision, Binding            
Technical Standards, Keynesian revolution, macroeconomics, micro economic inefficiency 
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Implementing Basel III Through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV: 
Leverage Ratios and Capital Adequacy Requirements 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
According to the European Banking Authority (EBA), “the overarching goal of the Basel III agreement and its                 
implementing Act, the CRD IV package, is:  1
 
- to strengthen the resilience of the EU banking sector so that it would be better placed to absorb                  
economic shocks whilst ensuring that banks continue to finance economic activity and growth.” 
 
 
The CRD IV package, which was introduced in 2013, replaces the Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49, with a                 
Directive and Regulation. The CRD IV entered into force on 1 January 2014 - with some phasing in                  2
arrangements taking place between 2014 and 2019. 
 
The first consultative paper on a new capital adequacy framework, which was issued by the Basel Committee                 
on Banking Supervision, introduced the „three pillar“ model which encompasses the minimum capital             
requirements, supervisory review and market discipline - „as a lever to strengthen disclosure and encourage               
safe and sound banking practices.“ As well as the criticism related to the fact that it rewarded risk lending, the                    3
fact that „capital requirements were just reasonably related to banks’ risk taking activities and that the credit                 
exposure requirement was the same regardless of the credit rating of the borrower,“ a general criticism of                 4
Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. Such capital arbitrage being attributed to its wide                   
risk categories which provided banks with the liberty to „arbitrage between their economic assessment of risk                
and the regulatory capital requirements.”  5
„Regulatory capital arbitrage“, a practice which involves banks „using securitisation to alter the profile of their                
book“ usually produces the effect of making bank's capital ratios appear inflated. Four identified types of                6
capital arbitrage are:   cherry picking, securitisation with partial recourse, remote origination and indirect credit. 7
 
1 European Banking Authority, Implementing Basel III Europe: CRD IV Package  
http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementing-basel-iii-europe  
 
2 “The Regulation, the CRR, contains detailed prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms whilst the                 
new Directive covers areas of the current Capital Requirements Directive where EU provisions need to be transposed by                  
Member States in a way suitable to their respective environment.” see ibid 
3 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework' 3rd June 1999 
http://www.bis.org/press/p990603.htm> 
 
4 See M Saidenberg and T Schuermann, 'The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research' (2003) Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 2003 at page 4 
 
5 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel Accord'  
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers April 1999 at page 21 
 
6 See ibid; Bank's capital ratio may appear inflated „relative to the riskiness of the remaining exposure“ see ibid 
7 Ibid at pages 22-24 
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The Second Consultative Paper, issued by the Basel Committee in January 2001, introduced the two Internal                
Ratings Based (IRB) methodologies – the Foundational IRB and the Advanced IRB methodologies. The              
Internal Ratings Based approach to capital requirements for credit risk, not only relies significantly on the                
internal assessment carried out by a bank, in relation to counterparties and exposures, but is also geared                 
towards the achievement of two primary goals, namely: „additional risk sensitivity“ and „incentive             8
compatibility“. 
 
Basel 2 is premised on a three level approach which permits banks to select from three models, namely: the                   
basic standardized model, the IRB foundation approach and the advanced ratings approach. According to the               
Consultative Document on Standard Approach to Credit Risk, capital requirements under the standardized             9
approach are considered to be more synchronised and in harmony with the principal elements of banking risk                 
– owing to the introduction of more differentiated risk weights and a broader recognition of techniques which                 
are applied in mitigating risk whilst such techniques attempt to avoid undue complexity. As a result, capital                 
ratios generated through the standardized approach, should adapt more to present and actual risks              
encountered by banks, than was the case previously. 
 
 
Under Pillar One minimum capital requirements, operational risk is to be corroborated by capital.              
Measurement approaches for operational risk can be found in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and               
there are three broad approaches to the capital assessment of operational risk which are as follows: 
 
- Basic Indicator Approaches 
- Standardized Approaches 
- Internal Measurement Approach 
 
The developments and evolution across the Basel Capital Accords have illustrated their focus to address               
prevailing financial risks at the time, their focus on the regulation of complex financial instruments such as hedge                  
funds, the pro cyclical nature of risks and the need to mitigate occurrences related to regulatory capital                 
arbitrage. The era of Basel III has also witnessed the introduction of liquidity standards – these being the first                   
of their kind, However the need to address off balance sheet instruments, complex derivative products,               
exposures of various kinds – and particularly those exposures relating to derivatives, off balance sheet and                
leverage, as well as those risks attributed to non-bank institutions, continually constitute a vital focal point. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: The next section discusses Basel III Liquidity Standards, Basel III                
Leverage and Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratios and their role as complements to the risk based capital                 
adequacy framework. The relationship between Basel III and the Capital Requirements Directive IV is then               
considered under section BII whilst the literature review section (BIII) highlights gaps which exist in the current                 
8 In establishing an Internal Ratings Based approach, the Committee's intention was directed at „fine tuning capital  
requirements with a greater degree of accuracy to the level of a bank's exposure to credit risks.“ Basel Committee on  
Banking Supervision, 'The Internal Ratings Based Approach' Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord 2001  
at pages 1 and 3 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf 
 
9  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting  
Document to the New Basel Accord January 2001 at page 1 http;//www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf 
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and previous literature on the topic - with particular reference to micro economic efficiency and corporate                
governance are highlighted.  
 
Section C then consolidates on the Basel Leverage Ratio's role as a supplementary measure to the risk-based                 
capital adequacy framework, as well as the impact of the recent legislative proposals and changes on risk                 
taking activities. Components of the Basel III Level Ratio and recent proposals aimed at updating such                
components are considered – with the aim of highlighting the importance of such updates in the minimisation of                  
regulatory capital arbitrage activities. Section D then considers not only the events leading up to (as well as                  
culminating) in the 2013 Rule and the Final Rule, but also arguments put forward to bolster U.S proposals to                   
update the Basel Leverage Ratio. 
 
In concluding the paper, reference is made to the all-important need to achieve a balance between the need for                   
consistency, comparability and improved harmonisation whilst ensuring that simplicity and a „one size fits all“               
approach does not promote a situation whereby credible and accurate results are neglected at the expense of                 
achieving a standardized approach.  
 
 
 
 
B Basel III Liquidity Standards, Basel III Leverage and Basel III Supplementary Leverage 
Ratios: Complements to the Risk Based Capital Adequacy Framework 
 
Whilst the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)'s objective is aimed at „promoting the short-term resilience of the                
liquidity risk profile of banks by ensuring that banks have an adequate stock of unencumbered high quality                 
assets (HQLA) that can be converted easily and immediately into cash“ to meet the liquidity needs of private                  
markets for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is targeted at                  
medium to longer term funding activities of banking institutions. By the very nature of the definition of these                  
liquidity standards, the first to be introduced under Basel III, it is not difficult to comprehend why the Liquidity                   
Coverage Ratio constitutes the more crucial standard. 
 
The NSFR serves as a complementary standard to the LCR in serving to „limit over-reliance on short-term                 
wholesale funding during times of buoyant market liquidity and encourage better assessment of liquidity risk               
across all on- and off-balance sheet items“ as well as a „minimum enforcement mechanism.“ 
 
As is the case with the two liquidity standards which are intended to serve as complementary measures to the                   
risk-based capital adequacy framework, the Basel III Leverage Ratio was established by the Basel Committee               
as a non-risk based measure which is intended to serve as a supplement to the Basel risk based capital                   
framework. The merits of the Leverage Ratio as a supplement to the risk based capital adequacy framework                 
include: i) Its constraint of the build-up of leverage in the banking sector – which the risk based regime is not                     10
equipped to address; ii) Through a non-risk based „backstop“ which ultimately serves to protect against model                
risk, and the reduction of capital requirements, its reinforcement of risk based requirements; iii) Its role as a                  
standardized measure that investors and counterparties can use in making comparisons between banks over a               
10 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Discussion Paper 'The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk 
Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability“ July 2013 Bank for International Settlements Publications at page 16 
 
5 
period of time; iv) The establishment by certain academics that the leverage ratio is a „statistically significant“                 
predictor of potential bank failures. 
 
Hence it can be illustrated that the Basel III Leverage ratio not only serves as a supplementary measure to the                    
risk based capital adequacy framework, but also a means whereby the facilitation of greater comparability               
between banks can be achieved (since standardization promotes consistency, enhanced transparency and            
disclosure). It vital role as a supplementary tool to the risk based capital adequacy framework in countering                 
risk taking incentives is hence illustrated. 
 
- An underlying feature of the financial crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet                 
leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while maintaining               
strong risk-based capital ratios. At the height of the crisis, the market forced the banking sector to                 
reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices. This deleveraging               
process exacerbated the feedback loop between losses, falling bank capital, and shrinking credit             
availability.  11
 
The Basel III reforms introduced a „simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio which is intended to                
serve – not only as a „credible supplementary measure to the risk-based capital requirements“ but also:  12
 
• restrict the build-up of leverage in the banking sector to avoid destabilising deleveraging processes that can                 
damage the broader financial system and the economy; and 
• reinforce the risk-based requirements with a simple, non-risk-based “backstop” measure. 
 
Furthermore, the Basel Committee is of the view that:  13
 
• a simple leverage ratio framework is critical and complementary to the risk-based capital framework; and 
• a credible leverage ratio is one that ensures broad and adequate capture of both the on- and off-balance                   
sheet leverage of banks. 
 
 
BII The Relationship Between Basel III and the Capital Requirements Directive IV 
 
The legislative package for the CRD IV was adopted by the European Parliament and the EU Commission in                  
April 2013, with the CRD IV changes being grouped into two areas:  14
 
- capital reform 
- liquidity standards 
 
11 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and  
Disclosure Requirements June 2013 at page 4 of 22 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf 
 
12 ibid 
13 ibid 
14 See KPMG, “CRD IV: Single Rule Book for EU Banking Regulation Changes and Implications” May 2013  
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“The enhanced Basel II Framework (which includes reforms aimed at increasing the quantity of capital - as                 
well as improving the quality of capital), and the macroprudential overlay (together), are referred to as Basel                 
III.” 
 
Under Basel II, the Tier One Capital ratio which banks were required to retain was 4%. Under Basel III, this                    
has been raised to 6%. 
 
Further, whilst Basel II stipulated a Core Tier One capital ratio of 2%, this has been increased to 4.5% under                    
Basel III and comprises of common equity before deductions. 
 
In respect of the capital conservation buffer, Basel III regulations require that banks retain a capital                
conservation buffer of 2.5% - bringing total common equity requirements to 7%. 
 
In respect of the countercyclical buffer, Basel III regulations stipulate a requirement within a range of 0% and                  
2.5% of “common equity or other fully absorbing capital” to be implemented according to national               
circumstances. 
 
Both the capital conservation and counter cyclical buffers did not exist under Basel II. 
 
Under Basel III, additional capital requirements have also been stipulated for systemically relevant financial              
institutions. 
 
The CRD IV is also aimed at:  15
 
- Increasing the quality of eligible capital 
- Increasing the quantity of capital held by establishing significantly higher minimum capital ratios and              
reducing pro cyclicality through the introduction of the new capital buffers 
- Increasing the capital requirements for Counterparty Credit Risk - including a new capital charge for               
potential mark-to-market losses on OTC derivatives 
- Introduction of a non risk based leverage ratio to safeguard build-up of leverage in the system  
 
Key CRD IV provisions in relation to increased quality of capital, include the following:  16
 
- Common equity Tier One becomes the primary measure of capital adequacy 
- Basel II deductions are applied in full to common equity Tier One rather than 50:50 
- Exclusion of hybrid instruments from common equity Tier One (with stricter criteria for inclusion of               
instruments in additional Tier One) 
- Harmonised and stricter requirements for Tier 2 
- Tier 3 capital no longer eligible  
 
 
 
 
15  see ibid 
16 ibid 
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Key CRD IV provisions in relation to increased quantity of capital, include the following:  17
 
- Minimum common equity Tier One ratio of 4.5% (excluding buffers) 
- Minimum Tier One ratio of 6% (excluding buffers) 
- Minimum total capital of 8% (excluding buffers) 
- Introduction of three capital buffers: namely, the capital conservation buffer, counter-cyclical buffer and             
the systemic buffer 
 
The significance of the CRD IV in implementing Basel III lies in the fact that Basel III will become more                    
directly binding and enforceable in EU member states. This differs significantly from the previous situation with                
Basel II, not just because two directives (Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49), existed then, but because of the                 
European Banking Authority’s new mandate (as will be illustrated in the conclusive section of this paper), in                 
generating Binding Technical Standards (BTS). BTS are to be adopted by the European Commission by               
means of REgulations or Decisions - regulations being binding and directly applicable in member states,               
according to EU Law. 
 
The ensuing sub section is not only aimed at considering the relevance of Basel III - from the perspective of its                     
macro-economic focus, but also addressing gaps in the literature on liquidity risk, but also to highlight why pre                  
dominantly based dispersed ownership structures - such as those which prevail in the United Kingdom and the                 
United States, need to focus more on the issues related to liquidity risk, whilst concentrated ownership based                 
structures and systems (inclusive of family firms) need to focus on their accounting frameworks, the vital role                 
played by audit committees and audits, in order to ensure that objectives of the Basel risk based capital                  
framework, as well as certain corporate governance objectives are fulfilled. 
 
 
 
BIII Growing Importance of Macro-Economic Perspectives and Accounting For the Gaps in the            
Literature on Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetries through Liquidity Risk          
Considerations 
 
“First and foremost, this is a crisis of economics and particularly of conventional macroeconomics. The               
discussion of the shocks……. demonstrates quite clearly that the waves of huge crises which hit the                
high-income economies was not a result of events outside the economic system, such as an unexpected war or                  
a vast natural disaster…….. 
 
Secondly, this has been a crisis of the financial system. Naturally and inevitably, efforts have been made to                  
tighten up regulation and improve the resilience of the system. These efforts are not insignificant. But in                 
essence, they are conservative: an attempt to preserve the essence of a system that we already know is                  
extremely fragile……..”  18
 
 
17 ibid 
18 See prologue, M Wolf, The Shifts and the Shocks: What We’ve Learned - and Have Still to Learn” 2014 Penguin Press                      
New York 
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In his article, Boettke illustrates how “new economics of Keynes moved away from the methodological               19
individualist position and questioned the self regulatory robustness of the market economy.” He further adds               
that instead of reliance on market forces to self- correct for errors in investment, the government was given the                   
policy role of correcting for market instability and that in addition to this Keynesian revolution in macro                 
economics, economists started to develop arguments about the micro economic efficiency of the market              
economy - with theories of imperfect competition and monopolistic competition being developed during the              
1930s. 
 
The shortcomings of macro economics, the reliability of macro economic indicators have been brought to light                
following the recent Financial Crisis. Furthermore, the extent of government intervention in regulation is very               
evident as revealed through the G20 gathering of member states which promulgated the introduction of Basel                
III measures. To what extent should judiciary, legislature or the executive intervene in regulatory standard               
setting? Will the Basel III’s more macro economic focus resolve issues which are attributed to monetary and                 
fiscal shortcomings? From this perspective, those discussions relating to monetary policy, which have             
considered problems of addressing challenges presented by inflexible wages are also relevant. This is also               
relevant to the present crises encountered by the Eurozone in respect of German wage flexibility and lack of                  
competitiveness in the rest of the Eurozone.  20
 
Even though micro economic theory has lost much of its relevance over the years, as rightly highlighted, 
  
- the analysis of fine details of the economy’s structure, can teach one to understand such vital issues as                  
the role of competition.”  21
 
In addressing more effectively, fiscal and monetary policy issues, there is need for greater focus on the                 
underlying basis of these issues which could be provided through greater research on micro economic theories                
and an appreciation of the answers which could be provided through greater exploration of these theories. 
 
 
It has been argued in many studies, that bank capital ratios and several other financial indicators do not serve                   
as effectively in emerging market economies ( as is the case with industrial nations). According to                
Rojas-Suarez (2002), the capital-to-asset ratio, has under-performed as an indicator of banking crisis related              
problems in Latin America and Asia.   22
 
Two reasons which have been put forward as explanations for this are:  23
− Severe deficiencies in the accounting and regulatory framework in these jurisdictions; 
 
19  See P Boettke, “Information and Knowledge: Austrian Economics in Search of Its Uniqueness” The Review of Austrian 
Economics, 15:4, 263–274, 2002  Kluwer Academic Publishers at page 264 
20 For further information on this see A Review, by Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University Prospect Magazine, August 20, 2014 
21 See F Hayek, “Competition as A Discovery Procedure” THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS VOL. 
5, NO. 3 (SUMMER 2002) page 10 
22  L Rojas-Suarez, „Rating Banks in Emerging Markets: What Credit Agencies Should Learn From Financial Indicators (2002) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=300891 
 
23 ibid 
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− Lack of liquid markets for bank shares, subordinated debt and other bank liabilities and assets which are                  
required to confirm and justify the actual worth of a bank – rather than merely its accounting value. 
 
To which it will also be added that audits, which serve as vital signalling mechanisms in capital markets, have                   
limited roles in many emerging economies than is the case with more industrialised nations. 
 
Even though it is widely acknowledged that systems founded on concentrated ownership systems (that is,               
where a dominant shareholder prevails) are less susceptible to information asymmetries, it cannot be              
conclusively argued that such systems are immune from or less culpable of those issues associated with lack of                  
transparency and inadequate disclosure requirements. 
 
Regardless of the distinctive features which may exist between family firms and those other firms which are not                  
family-run, but which are predominantly based on concentrated ownership systems and structures, one             
common feature between these concentrated ownership based structured firms and enterprises is, namely, their              
reduced dependence on audits and audit committees - as well as the existence of relatively thin audit markets,                  
when compared to their pre-dominantly based dispersed ownership counterparts (and mainly industrial nations             
where the demand for audits, and audit markets are much greater).  
 
Audits are regarded as vital signalling mechanisms which are supposed to reduce information asymmetries - if                
such audits provide credibility to the financial statements (on which opinions are provided and relied upon by                 
shareholders and investors) as they should. Furthermore, disclosure stringent accounting, audit requirements            
which operate in many capital market economies and predominantly based dispersed ownership systems and              
structures, should serve as means of fostering greater transparency, disclosure and accountability. 
 
Hence should it still be concluded that structures based on concentrated ownership models are less susceptible                
to information asymmetries and “free-rider” problems? 
 
The definition of liquidity, as provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), is “the ability of a bank                   
to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses. The                 
fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes               
banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets                
as a whole.”  24
 
A liquidity crisis is considered to be „the classic type of banking crisis whereby a bank for some reason,                   
cannot meet all its payment obligations.“ The role played by imperfect knowledge in triggering such a crisis is                  25
further elaborated. In this sense, bank runs are triggered as a result of such „imperfect knowledge which                 
customers have of their banks, and the links through the interbank market and payment system.“ Such role                 26
played by imperfect knowledge or information asymmetries in triggering such crises could also be extended to                
enterprises, firms and organisations - and not just banking organisations. 
 
24   Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision Sept 2008 at page 1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm> 
25 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at pages 531 and 532 
26  ibid 
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Results obtained by Fu, Lu-Andrews and Yu-Thompson reveal that family firms incorporated in their study,               27
with better quality of corporate governance mechanisms, are associated with higher levels of corporate liquidity               
and stock liquidity, as well as lower level of liquidity risk. Whilst the issue relating to reduced information                  
asymmetries with concentrated ownership structures (in comparison with predominantly based dispersed           
ownership systems and structures) appears less contentious, a more contentious issue is that relating to               
whether better corporate governance mechanisms operate in concentrated ownership structures than is the             
case with predominantly based dispersed ownership structures and systems. Audit committees, whose            
operation are more common and widespread in predominantly based dispersed ownership structures, are by              
definition, considered to be “internal monitoring devices which are supportive of good corporate governance              
practices.” 
 
The Cadbury definition of corporate governance, that is, “the system whereby companies and directors are               
directed and controlled” or a structure whereby those enterprises are governed and directed, as well as certain                 
vital elements of corporate governance, namely: supervision, monitoring, accountability, transparency and           
disclosure, have profound repercussions in the evaluation of how well corporate governance mechanisms             
operate in dispersed ownership systems - as well as in relation to concentrated ownership structures or                
systems. 
 
According to Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon, “the main governance issue facing family firms is              28
balancing the benefits associated with having a controlling family with the challenges the structure imposes on                
minority shareholders. Common governance mechanisms are less likely to be effective whenever control and              
decision rights are concentrated around a family.” 
 
Further, is it widely acknowledged in the literature that even though dispersed ownership firms usually               
encounter the traditional principal agent problem, conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and             
non-controlling shareholders (minority shareholders) are more prevalent with concentrated ownership          
structures.  29
 
With respect to corporate governance, effects of family owned firms on performance could be considered to                
be another distinctive feature - in addition to blood relations involved in the control of family run firms - when                    
comparing and contrasting with other firms which are based on concentrated ownership structures but not run                
by family or blood relations. Resources available to family run firms to conduct full scale audits, the structure of                   
the firm, whether CEO and other duties are adequately segregated or all performed by the same individual, as                  
well as the competence or qualifications required to effectively supervise or engage auditors, are all decisive                
and contributory in the determination of whether adequate accountability, supervision, monitoring, transparency            
and disclosure requirements are met in fulfilling corporate governance criteria. 
 
Even though the ensuing subsection is exclusively dedicated to highlighting the benefits of the Basel Leverage                
Ratio, reasons for recent proposals aimed at updating the originally introduced Basel Leverage Ratio will be                
27 L Fu, R Lu-Andrews and Y Y-Thompson “Liquidity and Corporate Governance:Evidence From Family Firms” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2433764 
28 M Bennedsen, F Perez-Gonzalez and D Wolfenzon“The Governance of Family Firms” 
http://web.stanford.edu/~fperezg/familyfirmresearch.pdf 
29 See M Ojo, “Why the Traditional Principal Agent Theory May No Longer Apply to Concentrated Ownership Systems and 
Structures” http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50832/1/MPRA_paper_50832.pdf 
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considered in the ensuing section. From the discussions related to predominantly based dispersed ownership              
systems and concentrated ownership structures, it can easily be seen why the risk based capital adequacy                
framework is of such vital importance to capital market based economies such as the United Kingdom and the                  
United States. However greater focus will be required in relation to liquidity risks in these systems - just as                   
more efforts are required to upgrade the status of audits and audit committees in many concentrated ownership                 
based systems and structures. 
 
 
 
 
C. The Basel Leverage Ratio's Role as a Supplementary Measure to The Risk Based Capital              
Adequacy Framework 
 
According to Valladares, the June 2013 proposed leverage ratios by the Basel Committee, is a necessary                
supplement to the current risk-weighted asset credit risk measurement and is crucial to making banks better                
capitalized to sustain unexpected losses. Even though many criticisms have arisen in relation to the risk taking                 30
incentives that could be induced by such recent Basel leverage proposals, the following observations highlight               
the importance of incorporating and supplementing risk based capital ratios, leverage ratios and the liquidity               
requirements with themselves since the implementation of one ratio in isolation, as will be highlighted, is likely to                  
facilitate the tendencies for riskier ventures: 
 
Valladares raises the point that even though critics of the proposed Basel guidelines argue that the leverage                 
ratio would encourage banks to transact riskier on- or off-balance sheet instruments, that: 
 
- if banks were to do so, such added riskiness would, however, raise banks' RWAs and force them to                   
increase their capital. This action would also impact their liquidity coverage ratio by making the banks less                 
liquid since most risky assets do not count for the LCR - which is another reason why the leverage ratio is an                      
important complement to the RWA and liquidity buffers.  31
 
In bolstering this viewpoint, Bundesbank Vice President Sabine Lautenschlaeger has reiterated that „the             
leverage ratio shouldn’t be the main gauge because it doesn’t demand more capital to back the more                 
loss-prone investments, and thus can give bankers “unhealthy incentives” to take on more risk.“ 
In accentuating the need for its complementary function and role to the risk-based capital framework, the                
Basel leverage ratios must be linked to the risk based capital adequacy framework – both in respect of their                   
calculations, metrics and measures, as well as primary objectives and goals in introducing such leverage ratios.                
Some of the objectives for originally introducing leverage ratios in 2010 being the creation of a “secondary                 
metric which was simple and transparent – whereby regulators could assess balance sheet sizes appropriately”               
as well as the need to facilitate more consistent modes of measurements of risk weighted assets. 
 
30 M Rodriguez Valladares, 'Why Basel' Latest Leverage Ratio is Better' 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-basels-latest-leverage-ratio-is-better-1060635-1.html 
 
 
31 ibid 
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In its aims to address concerns raised by the Basel Committee’s June 2013 consultative paper, namely                
concerns that the Consultative Paper’s definition of exposure was “too expansive”, that is, “the leverage ratio’s                
denominator was too large” changes have been made to the June 2013 paper, as evidenced by the more                  32
recent January 2014 update and the April 2014 Final Standard for measuring and controlling large exposures.                
These changes introduce a more simplistic, consistent approach to the measurement of exposures through              
incorporating the use of credit conversion factors (CCFs). 
 
According to the January 2014 revised leverage ratio standard, in the risk based capital framework, off                33
balance sheet items are converted under the standardised approach into credit exposure equivalents through              
the use of credit conversion factors. It is also stipulated that the CCFs set out in paragraphs 14-22 of its                    
Annex must be applied to notional amounts – for purposes of determining the exposure amount of Off Balance                  
Sheet (OBS) items for leverage ratio. 
 
 
C.II  Components of the Basel III Leverage Ratio and Recent Updates to the Components 
 
The Basel III Leverage Ratio is defined as the Capital Measure (the numerator) divided by the Exposure                 
Measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed as a percentage and with the basis of calculation being                 
the average of the three month-end leverage ratios over a quarter. As reported by DB Research, the Basel                  34
Committee's issuance of its consultation paper on common definitions for the non-binding leverage ratio              
enshrined in Basel III, is not only considered to be an indication of a clear preference to move to a binding                     
leverage ratio, the new Basel definition, it is further contended, would „disallow much of the derivatives netting                 
which had seen US banks post substantially stronger leverage ratios than most European institutions.”  35
32 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Regulatory Brief: Basel Leverage Ratios: No Cover For US Banks” January 2014 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/fs-reg-brief-dodd-frank-basel-leve
rage-ratio.pdf Also see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Supervisory Framework for Measuring and  
Controlling Large Exposures - Final Standard” 
See particularly paragraph 35 “For the purpose of the large exposures framework, off-balance sheet items will be converted  
into credit exposure equivalents through the use of credit conversion factors (CCFs) by applying the CCFs set out for the  
standardised approach for credit risk for risk -based capital requirements, with a floor of 10%. ” 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs283.htm and  
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document: The Non Internal Model Method for Capitalising  
Counterparty Credit Risk Exposures (June 2013) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs254.htm and: 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “The Standardised Approach for Measuring Counterparty Credit Risk Exposures  
(March 2014) Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.htm 
 
 
 
33 see paragraph 39 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure  
Requirements” January 2014 
 
 
34 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and  
Disclosure Requirements at page 5 of 22 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf 
 
35 DB Research, “Leverage Ratio: Pressure on Europe is Rising” http://www.dbresearch.de/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB? 
addmenu=false&document=PROD0000000000317297&rdShowArchivedDocus=true&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_DE- 
PROD$NAVIGATION&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD 
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As highlighted under section B, one of the goals of leverage ratios, as intended by the Basel Committee on                   
Banking Supervision, is to ensure that both on and off balance sheet leverage of banks are adequately                 
captured and accounted for. Given the revisions which have occurred, following the introduction of the original                
2010 Basel Leverage Ratios, it would be expected that subsequent revisions would have the effect of                
expanding the denominator component, namely the exposure component – as a means of highlighting the               
commitment to expand the horizons being accounted for, as regards exposures – particularly credit exposures.               
Even though the numerator component, comprising Tier One capital of the risk-based capital framework, is               
also important, in line with the goals of adequately capturing on and off balance sheet exposures, the                 
importance of focussing on the denominator component (which comprises of the exposure measure) of the               
Basel III Leverage Ratio is also illustrated thus: 
 
 
Components of the Exposure Measure 
 
A bank’s exposure measure is considered to be the sum of the following: 
 
- On balance sheet exposures 
- Derivative exposures 
- Securities Financing Transaction Exposures 
- Off balance sheet (OBS) items 
 
According to the most recent, updated Standard on leverage ratios (hereinafter referred to as “the Final                
Standard”), issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2014, the exposure measure               36
for the leverage ratio, should generally, follow the accounting value, subject to the following: 
 
● On-balance sheet, non derivative exposures are included in the exposure measure net of specific provisions or                
accounting valuation adjustments; 
● Netting of loans and deposits is NOT allowed. 
 
As well as disallowing the “netting” of loans and deposits, the January 2014 final standard on leverage ratios,                  37
as issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in compliance with the June revision, also provides                 
under paragraph 30 that, in order to capture the credit exposure to the underlying reference entity, in addition                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements” January  
2014 Bank for International Settlements Publications, see paragraph 12. It is however contended that this version is a  
“near final version”. 
 
37  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements” January  
2014 Bank for International Settlements Publications 
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to the prescribed CCR treatment for derivatives and related collateral, the effective notional amount referenced               
by a written credit derivative is to be included in the exposure measure.  
 
However, in contrast to its predecessor,  which highlighted under paragraph 27 that: 
 
- collateral received in connection with derivative contracts does not reduce the economic leverage inherent in a bank’s derivatives position. In                     
particular, the exposure arising from the contract underlying is not reduced. As such, collateral received (cash or non-cash) may not be netted                      
against derivatives exposures whether or not netting is permitted under the bank’s operative accounting or risk-based framework 
 
the Final Standard, paragraph 23 projects a more lenient and cautious tone in its approach to netting: 
 
- collateral received in connection with derivative contracts does not necessarily reduce the leverage inherent in a bank’s derivatives position,                   
which is generally the case if the settlement exposure arising from the underlying derivative contract is not reduced. As a general rule, collateral                       
received may not be netted against derivative exposures whether or not netting is permitted under the bank’s operative accounting or risk-based                     
framework. Hence, when calculating the exposure amount by applying paragraphs 19 to 21 above, a bank must not reduce the exposure amount                      
by any collateral received from the counterparty. 
 
 
Furthermore, extended provisions have been included to permit certain netting transactions between            
counterparties – to the extent that certain provisions and conditions stipulated in the Final Standard are met.  
 
As a means of ensuring consistency, comparability and accuracy in its calculations and measurements, the               
same coverage as that adopted for regulatory consolidation – as used within the risk-based capital framework,                
is applied by the Basel III leverage ratio framework.  
 
 
In contrast to many other jurisdictions, the U.S has introduced proposals aimed at enhancing the Basel III                 
leverage ratios, (the recently revised Supplementary Leverage ratios), as well as the Dodd Frank Leverage               
Ratio.  38
 
Recent proposals aimed at enhancing the Basel III leverage ratios in the U.S would result in an increase to 5                    
percent of assets for parent companies and 6 percent for their banking subsidiaries under a proposal which will                  
affect the eight globally systemically important banks in the U.S. In November 2012, the FSB and BCBS                 
published a list of banks that meet the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision definition of a G-SIB based                  
on year-end 2011 data. The eight globally systemically important banks in the U.S, identified as G-SIBs by the                  
Financial Stability Board, are: Bank of America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation,               
Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street               
Corporation and Wells Fargo & Company.  39
 
 
 
38 “Dodd Frank section 165 compels foreign banks to comply with banking rules. Whereas eight of the largest U.S banks  
meet the 3% ratio, many foreign banks are permitted to meet the 4% ratio”. See S Skyrm, “New Regulation and the  
Repo Market: Leverage Ratios” http://scottskyrm.com/2014/03/new-regulation-and-the-repo-market-leverage-ratios/ 
 
39 See Financial Stability Board, Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) (Nov. 1, 2012) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031ac.pdf 
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D. The 2013 Rule and the Final Rule 
 
The 2013 Rule „revised and replaced the agencies’ risk-based and leverage capital standards and established               
a 3 percent minimum supplementary leverage ratio for banking organizations subject to the agencies’ advanced               
approaches risk-based capital rules.“   The 2013 rule was adopted as a final rule on July 2, 2013. 40
 
Moreover, this final rule: 
 
- Implements a revised definition of regulatory capital; 
- A new common equity tier 1 minimum capital requirement; 
- A higher minimum tier 1 capital requirement; and 
 
For banking organizations subject to the advanced approaches risk-based capital rules, a supplementary             
leverage ratio that incorporates a broader set of exposures in the denominator.  41
 
Following the publication of the U.S Basel III Final Rule, many U.S banking agencies proposed higher                
leverage capital requirements for the eight U.S bank holding companies (BHCs) which have been identified by                
the Financial Stability Board, as global systemically important banks („referred to as „covered BHCs“) and               
their insured depository institution (IDI) subsidiaries: namely, Bank of America Corporation, The Bank of New               
York Mellon Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan               
Stanley, State Street Corporation and Wells Fargo & Company. 
 
An overview of some of the differences between the revised Basel III Leverage Ratios (as reflected by the                  
January 2014 update) and the US Supplementary Leverage Ratios is illustrated in the following table:  42
 
Source: http://blog.usbasel3.com/category/leverage-ratios/ 
 
 
 
 
 
40  See Federal Reserve, 'Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards  
for Certain Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions' at page 12 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130709a1.pdf. and also Federal Reserve, 'Federal Reserve  
Approves Final Rule...' „ The final rule minimizes burden on smaller, less complex financial institutions. It establishes an  
integrated regulatory capital framework that addresses shortcomings in capital requirements, particularly for larger,  
internationally active banking organizations, that became apparent during the recent financial crisis. The rule will  
implement in the United States the Basel III regulatory capital reforms from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  
and certain changes required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.“ See  
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130702a.htm> 
 
41 See Federal Reserve, Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy,  
Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets, Market Discipline and  
Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bcreg20130702a.pdf 
 
42 See D Polk, Visual Comparison Chart : US Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) vs Basel III Leverage Ratio 
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DII.  Arguments put forward by US Federal Agencies in Support of Recent Proposals 
 
According to a report by the Federal Reserve, the following arguments were provided in support of the need                  
for revisions to the Basel Leverage Ratios:  43
 
 
- BCBS’s approach for determining the minimum level of the Basel III leverage ratio was different than the                  
calibration approach described above for the risk-based capital ratios. 
 
- The BCBS used the most loss-absorbing measure of capital, common equity tier 1 capital, as the basis for                   
calibration for the risk-based capital ratios, but not for the Basel III leverage ratio. In addition, the BCBS did                   
not calibrate the minimum Basel III leverage ratio to meet explicit loss absorption and market confidence                
objectives as it did in calibrating the minimum risk-based capital requirements and did not implement a capital                 
conservation buffer level above the minimum leverage ratio. Rather, the BCBS focused on calibrating the Basel                
III leverage ratio to be a backstop to the risk-based capital ratios and an overall constraint on leverage. 
 
- The agencies believe that while the establishment of the Basel III leverage ratio internationally is an important                  
achievement, further steps could be taken to ensure that the risk-based and leverage capital requirements               
effectively work together to enhance the safety and soundness of the largest, most systemically important               
banking organizations. 
 
Furthermore, the agencies are of the opinion that the proposed rule would permit covered BHCs and their IDI                  
subsidiaries to fund themselves more than 90 percent with debt while still satisfying the proposed leverage                
thresholds.  44
 
Having highlighted the above, general consensus appears to favour proposals relating to the increase of Basel                
Leverage ratios in the U.S – with many commentators having considered the previous ratios to be inadequate. 
 
 
Arguments Favouring 2013 Basel Committee Revisions over those Updates Made to Basel            
Leverage Ratios in the U.S 
 
 
In commencing this section, it needs to be highlighted that the recent moves and proposals in the U.S, in                   
relation to the Basel Leverage Ratio, are very much welcomed and quite encouraging given the prior concerns                 
that the implementation of Basel rules, regulations and initiatives appeared to be implemented at a slow pace in                  
the U.S. The recent proposals in the U.S serve as indication, not only of the willingness to adopt Basel rules,                    
43 Federal Reserve, 'Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio 
Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions' pages 16 and 17 
 
 
44 Ibid at page 24 
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but also reveal the extra steps being taken to ensure that financial stability is fostered and more rigid and                   
stringent measures to avert another global scale crisis. 
 
 
Arguments favouring 2013 Basel Committee updates over those 2013 proposals introduced in the US, are               
partly based on the following: 
 
1) The fact that revisions and proposals undertaken in the U.S are premised on Tier 1 capital, instead of                   
higher-quality Core Tier 1. 
 
2) Recent Basel Guidelines (June 2013) are more extensive in scope as opposed to the denominator of the                  
U.S. leverage ratios which are based on original 2010 Basel Leverage ratios. 
 
3) The cumbersome nature of the supplementary leverage ratio – which in the opinion of many commentators,                 
will be more burdensome for subsidiaries of BHCs to comply with than the generally applicable leverage ratio                 
for U.S. banks. It is calculated using a „tighter definition of Tier 1 capital in the numerator and the denominator                    
includes off-balance sheet exposures such as the grossing-up of derivatives to include collateral and cash“               
(which is why many banks are likely to want to evade as much inclusion of such derivatives in the denominator                    
– given the value/magnitude of derivatives). The 6% standard is considered by many to be onerous for bank                  
subsidiaries covered by the proposal and may encourage banking groups to conduct certain activities, such as                
derivatives based activities, away from their subsidiaries.  
 
Furthermore, an introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio, it is most likely envisaged, will result in lower                 
dividends being distributed by the BHCs. 
 
4) The focus accorded to disclosures of the numerator and denominator components of the Basel Leverage                
Ratios in the Basel June 2013 Guidelines. 
 
According to paragraph 43 of the Consultative Document on the Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio framework                
and Disclosure Requirements:  45
 
- Public disclosure by banks of their Basel III leverage ratios commences on 1st January 2015 
 
- To enable market participants reconcile leverage ratio disclosures with banks' published financial statements              
from period to period, and to compare the capital adequacy of banks across jurisdictions with varying                
accounting frameworks, it is important that banks adopt a consistent and common disclosure of the main                
components of the leverage ratios while reconciling to their published financial statements. 
 
45 June 2013, Bank for International Settlements Publications, page 11 
19 
Paragraphs 44 as well as 45 underline the Committee's commitments to, as well as its realisation of the need                   46
for focus on measures and initiatives aimed at facilitating the harmonisation and consistency of disclosure               
requirements across various jurisdictional frameworks which would also result in the facilitation of the              
realisation of the Basel Committee's objectives and aims. 
 
Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratios (ESLR) – 2014 U.S Revisions 
 
In April 2014, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Board of Governors of the Federal                
Reserve System (the FRB) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the OCC) took two important                  
steps:  47
 
1) The Agencies approved a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “NPR”, and the rules stipulated therein, the                
“Proposed Rules”) which would revise the definition and scope of the “total leverage exposure”, which is the                 
denominator of the SLR (hence, also the denominator of the enhanced SLR). 
2) The Agencies approved final rules (the “Final Rules”) that would effectively result in a rise from the SLR’s                  
usual 3% minimum SLR standard to 5% for bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of more                 
than $70 billion or assets under custody of more than $10 trillion and 6% for their insured depository institution                   
subsidiaries. 
 
Following the issue of the January 2014 revised Basel leverage ratios, Pricewaterhouse were of the opinion                
that U.S regulators would not only have to decide whether an alteration of the exposure calculations of the                  
supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) would be necessary (as a means of further harmonizing with the January                
2014 revised Basel leverage ratios), but also decide if they would, more importantly, adjust the Enhanced                
Supplementary Leverage Ratios. It is Pricewaterhouse’ view that U.S regulators are unlikely to lower the               48
ESLR’s 2% buffer – primarily attributable to the fact that U.S regulators are considered to view the ESLR as                   
a “needed complement to risk-based capital standards (as opposed to a “back-stop”).  49
46 Which states that „to facilitate consistency and ease of use of disclosures relating to the composition of the leverage ratio,  
and to mitigate the risk of inconsistent formats undermining the objective of enhanced disclosure, the Basel Committee  
has agreed that internationally active banks across Basel member jurisdictions, will be required to publish their leverage  
ratio according to a common template.“ 
 
47 See Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, „Bank Capital: Supplementary Leverage Ratio, Federal Banking Agencies Propose  
Revisions to the Supplementary Leverage Ratio’s Exposure Measure and Approve Final Rules Implementing an Enhanced  
Supplementray Levrage Ratio for the Largest U.S Baking Organizations“ April 16 2014 
In April 2014, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the  
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) “adopted a final rule to strengthen the leverage ratio standards for the largest, most  
interconnected U.S. banking organizations. The final rule applies to U.S. top-tier bank holding companies with more than  
$700 billion in consolidated total assets or more than $10 trillion in assets under custody (covered BHCs) and their insured  
depository institution (IDI) subsidiaries.“ See Agencies Adopt Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Final Rule and  
Issue Supplementary Leverage Ratio Notice of Proposed Rulemaking  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140408a.htm 
 
48 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Regulatory Brief : Basel Leverage Ratios: No Cover For US Banks” January 2014 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/fs-reg-brief-dodd-frank-basel-leve
rage-ratio.pdf 
 
49  Ibid. This view being shared by PwC even though “the impact of the ESLR’s 2% buffer is further accentuated by the  
competitive advantage which the now more aligned revised January 2014 leverage ratio provides non-US banks.” 
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The need for consistency in the implementation of Basel requirements and regulations is all the more vital and                  
necessary if practices relating to regulatory capital arbitrage are to be minimised and controlled. Differences in                
the implementation of Basel requirements and rules across various jurisdictions are evident from the very               
stringent application of rules in certain jurisdictions – as is recently evidenced by the U.S initiatives aimed at                  
increasing Basel III Leverage ratios (above global standards) to those jurisdictions where more lax approaches               
have been adopted. 
 
Evidence which highlights the fact that different countries could be inconsistently implementing parts of the               
Basel rules and regulations – either by consolidating or weakening the original requirements, is illustrated               
through the following:  50
. 
- In the EU, in relation to the Capital Requirements Directive/Regulation IV (CRD/RIV) - where based on                 
evidence from latest proposals and negotiations, EU member states will assume greater independence in their               
ability to increase capital requirements. 
 
- In China, where the implementation framework for Basel III is considered to be more stringent than the                  
international standard (with a requirement of a higher core tier 1 capital adequacy ratio – 5% as opposed to                   
4.5%, as well as a higher leverage ratio requirement of 4% as opposed to 3%). 
 
- In the U.S, as discussed throughout this paper, through recent proposals relating to standard and                
supplementary leverage ratios. 
 
Having highlighted the above, it is also worth mentioning that “over compliance” with rules (and particularly                
where it appears that such rules or ratios appear to be insufficient) – as indicated by the supplementary ratios                   
in the U.S, is certainly much better than under compliance. What may be regarded as overcompliance for a                  
particular jurisdiction may not necessarily be the case for another. Conversely what may be required for                
minimal compliance purposes in certain jurisdictions may prove inadequate for certain major economies.             
Hence it may be necessary to invent additional rules or supplement existing legislation and rules as a means of                   
achieving longer term efficiency in terms of overall costs and benefits to be generated from implementing new                 
innovative - but also complementary measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
E.  Sound Bank Stress Testing Techniques As Complementary Measures 
 
Sound stress testing practices, as identified by the Basel Committee, should embrace the provision of               
forward-looking assessments of risk, complement information from models and historical data, - as well as               
constitute an integral part of capital and liquidity planning. Even though the Basel capital accords have evolved,                 
 
50  See JP Morgan, 'Basel III Implementation: Is the Industry Running Out of Time?' 
http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Basel_III_implementation_Is_the_industry_running_out_of_time_/1320504512062 
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recurring lessons related to failures of mechanical approaches such as those of bank stress testing techniques,                
provide reflections of the fact that internal ratings based models should not always be expected to provide                 
credible results where standardization, particularly, is unduly resorted to. 
 
Standardization is certainly required for the basis of comparability – however, a healthy balance needs to be                 
struck between the extent of standardization and the need to obtain credible, reliable and accurate results. 
 
As is the case with the Basel Leverage Ratio, bank stress techniques should not be used in isolation. 
 
In effectively performing their roles as monitoring, predictive devices and risk management tools, they will               
greatly assist Basel Leverage ratios, as well as the risk based capital adequacy framework, in achieving their                 
intended aims and objectives. According to the Basel Committee, the financial crisis not only revealed               51
weaknesses in organisational aspects of stress testing programmes in the sense that prior to the crisis, stress                 
testing at some banks was carried out on an isolated basis ( by the risk function with little interaction with                    
business areas), but also the fact that test analyses were not credible.  
 
Furthermore, the mechanical approaches adopted by certain organisations resulted in inaccurate and unreliable             
results being generated. As rightly observed, by the Committee, „mechanical approaches can neither fully take               
account of changing business conditions nor incorporate qualitative judgments from across the different areas              
of a bank.“ 
 
Other identified weaknesses of stress testing programmes, as identified by the Committee include:  52
 
- Stress testing frameworks were usually not flexible enough to respond quickly as the crisis evolved (for                 
example, inability to aggregate exposures quickly, apply new scenarios or modify models). 
 
- Weaknesses in infrastructure limited the ability of banks to identify and aggregate exposures across the bank.                 
This weakness limits the effectiveness of risk management tools – including stress testing. 
 
- An appropriately conducted firm-wide stress test would have beneficially drawn together experts from              
across the organisation. For example, the expertise of retail lenders, who in some cases were reducing                
exposure to US subprime mortgages, should have counteracted the overly optimistic outlook of traders in               
securities backed by the same subprime loans. 
 
- That particular risks that were not covered in sufficient detail in most stress tests include: the behaviour of                   
complex structured products under stressed liquidity conditions; basis risk in relation to hedging strategies;              
pipeline or securitisation risk; contingent risks; and funding liquidity risk. 
 
- That, had stress tests adequately captured contractual and reputational risk associated with off-balance sheet               
exposures, concentrations in such exposures may have been avoided. 
 
51 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision May 2009  
at pages 8-12 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.htm 
 
52 see ibid 
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It was also identified by the Committee that most risk management models, including stress tests, use historical                 
statistical relationships to assess risk – under the assumption that risk is driven by a known and constant                  
statistical process, that historical relationships constitute a good basis for forecasting the development of future               
risks. The Financial Crisis, according to them, has revealed serious flaws with relying solely on such an                 
approach. 
 
 
 
F. Conclusion: Harmonisation and Challenges Resulting from Basel III Implementation in the           
EU 
 
As well as facilitating enhanced requirements for the quantity and quality of capital, serving as a basis for new                   
liquidity and leverage requirements, providing new rules for counterparty risk and new macro prudential              
standards, the CRD IV also introduces changes to rules on corporate governance (including remuneration), as               
well as introducing standardised EU regulatory reporting (COREP and FINREP).  53
 
Potential Basel III implementation issues for the Eurozone and European banks relate to increased cost of                
capital for banks, restrictions on distribution of earnings and dividends.  
 
However in relation to potential enforcement and compliance issues, the role assumed by the European               
Banking Authority, as well as tools being incorporated to ensure such enforcement and compliance, should               
serve to facilitate the implementation process - further improving convergence and harmonisation across the              
EU. 
 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) is now empowered to generate a number of Binding Technical               
Standards (BTS), guidelines, and reports for the implementation of the CRD IV package. 
 
- BTS are legal acts which specify particular aspects of an EU legislative text (Directive or Regulation)                
and aim to ensure that consistent harmonisation is achieved in specific areas.”  54
 
Guidelines are also illustrated by the EBA as being “important tools for fostering convergence of supervisory                
practices across the EU.” According to the EBA, although guidelines are not legally binding, supervisory               
authorities and institutions around Europe must make every effort to comply with them. Further the EBA adds                 
that supervisory authorities are particularly obliged to inform the EBA of their compliance or intention to                
comply with them and also to explain their reasons for eventual non compliance.  
 
Despite the merits of improved consistency and harmonisation in the implementation of Basel rules and               
regulations – such merits including enhanced facilitation of disclosure and transparency, a balance also needs to                
be struck between the need to avoid a „one size fits all“ situation whereby the needs of respective jurisdictions                   
are not met. 
 
 
53 See KPMG, “CRD IV: Single Rule Book For EU Banking Regulation Changes and Implications” May 2013 at page 8 
54 European Banking Authority, Implementing Basel III Europe: CRD IV Package  
http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementing-basel-iii-europe  
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The need to achieve more relevant and accurate results is evidenced by the evolution of the Basel capital                  
accords from the rather „crude“ original 1988 Capital Accord (which even though risk based, focussed               
exclusively on credit risk and did not apply risk weights in a specific and tailor made manner to asset classes)                    
to the adoption of more tailor made and specific internal ratings models. 
 
 
Whilst comparability and consistency, which is sometimes attributed to simpler and cruder models, may be               
desired, it is also vital that results derived from such models reflect the reality and accuracy of prevailing                  
conditions – hence the need to provide for models which provide and generate credible results. 
 
As identified by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its discussion paper „The Regulatory               
Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability,“ the disadvantages attributed to undue            55
complexity and reduced comparability in the capital framework, potentially“ include: 
 
 
- Increased difficulties for bank management in understanding the regulatory regime; 
- The challenges arising in capital planning; 
- Less accurate risk assessments; 
- The creation of regulatory gaps and opportunities for arbitrage; 
- An undermining of the ability of supervisors to effectively assess the capital adequacy of banks 
- Impediments presented to the effective review of the capital management process by supervisors. 
 
 
In addressing more effectively, fiscal and monetary policy issues, there is need for greater focus on the                 
underlying basis of these issues which could be provided through greater research on micro economic theories                
and an appreciation of the answers which could be provided through greater exploration of these theories. 
 
 
Furthermore, the importance of adequately addressing liquidity risks cannot be over-emphasised. Data            
generated from family firms as well as other firms whose systems and structures are regarded as synonymous                 
to those of concentrated ownership, are also therefore of vital importance and do indeed provide fertile ground                 
for future research. It will also be vital for such concentrated ownership systems and structures to review and                  
upgrade the status accorded to audits and audit committees if they are to effectively and maximally achieve                 
goals and objectives of the Basel Committee’s risk based adequacy framework, leverage ratios - as well as                 
improve on attributes of good corporate governance practices - namely accountability, adequate supervision,             
monitoring, transparency and disclosure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Discussion Paper 'The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity,              
Simplicity and Comparability“ July 2013 Bank for International Settlements Publications 
 at page 12 
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